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To start with, the question "To coordinate or not to coordinate?"
arises in light of the fact that in recent years the susceptibility of national
economies to external influences has increased. For one thing, right up
to the present time world trade has been growing faster than global
GNP. For another--and a far swifter development--the integration of
national financial markets has been making ever-greater headway. With
the dismantling of controls on capital movements, the introduction of
sophisticated communications techniques, and the advent of the finan-
cial innovations these techniques make possible, the mobility of capital
has been greatly augmented and the "global village" has become reality.
Financial news--good news and bad news, genuine news and false
news--spreads today no less quickly than news did in the villages of our
ancestors.
The Federal Republic of Germany has participated in a special way
in this growing interdependence of the world economy. Despite its
comparatively small size, my country’s exports in 1987 were higher than
those of the United States or Japan, although this admittedly owed
something to the fact that we still regard as exports our deliveries to
other countries of the European Economic Community, which one day
will only be deliveries within the single internal market. At all events,
economic growth in Germany hinges crucially on developments in
world markets and on the competitiveness of German industry. In
addition, the deutsche mark continues to be a major international
reserve and investment currency. Hence, interest rate movements in the
German capital market and the exchange rate of our currency reflect not
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only domestic economic influences but also trends in international
financial markets and fluctuations in the currency preferences of inter-
national investors. But even such an enormous economic area as the
United States increasingly feels the effects of international interrelation-
ships, the pressure of foreign competition on domestic and foreign
markets, the impact of exchange rate changes on global competitive
conditions, and their repercussions on national financial markets.
The high degree of interdependence of the goods and financial
markets throughout the world causes disturbances on specific markets
to spread very quickly to other countries. The oil price shocks, the
overshooting of the dollar rate in one direction or the other, the debt
problems facing many developing countries, and the stock market crash
in the fail of 1987 are examples of how strong global interdependence
has become. The same is true of national economic policy measures.
When making their decisions, economic policymakers must make allow-
ance for influences from abroad and the effects of measures taken
abroad. They also ought to pay regard to the repercussions of their own
actions on partner countries. They are not obliged to do so, and they
often fail to do so. But such "lone wolf" approaches to economic policy
are apt to come up against limits--the more so, the smaller the country.
"Le cavalier seul" is a common French expression for a lone ranger. But
many "lone ranger" expeditions have become proverbial for the early
end they have met.
In view of the clear loss of autonomy by national economic policy,
the calls for closer international cooperation are perfectly understand-
able. For example, if--as at the moment--external disequilibria are
difficult to remedy by means of isolated measures because of possible
adverse "spillover effects," international accords are an obvious step to
take. Without any doubt, some of the arguments adduced in the
literature in favor of international cooperation are quite convincing at
first sight. What has been referred to as the "theater syndrome"--an
attempt by some of the audience to improve their view by standing
up--implies in the end, when all are standing up, that all are worse off.
This strengthens the expectation that a cooperative approach is prefer-
able to a "non-cooperative equilibrium." In particular, international
cooperation is expected to bring about greater consistency in the
objectives and measures of economic policy in individual countries, so
that self-generated disruptions of the world economy can be avoided. By
stabilizing expectations, it is claimed, international cooperation would
provide a "public good," with the aid of which the unavoidable swings
in economic activity could be diminished in scale or shortened in
duration.
On closer inspection, however, the advantages of coordination are
by no means so unmistakable. They are difficult to demonstrate empir-
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an IMF staff paper that the gains deriving from cooperation are fairly
small: "Although the theoretical case in favor of policy coordination may
be strong, there are real-world problems that may limit its practical
possibilities (p. 284)." It appears that the success of a cooperative
strategy depends on a number of conditions that are not necessarily
fulfilled in economic reality:
First, the economic policymakers must have clear and consistent
ideas about the transmission mechanisms of their decisions.
Jeffrey Frankel has just pointed out that cooperation may even
lead to worse results than isolated national action if the cooper-
ation process is based on a misspecified macroeconomic model or
the participants hold differing views. Let us suppose, for in-
stance, that one country believes that changes in its national
interest rate level have no effect on the exchange rates of its
national currency, while its partner countries are convinced that
these changes are operating in the wrong direction. How can
cooperation be possible in such a case?
Second, all parties to the cooperative process will therefore be
required to keep to the "rules of the game," and in the same way.
The question that arises in this context concerns the sanctions to
be imposed if a country deviates--no matter for what reasons--
from the internationally agreed economic policy stance. "Peer
pressure" or "reputational considerations" are conceivable, but
can be applied only within limits. A country’s feeling of sover-
eignty must not be disregarded. Nor may the impression be given
that adjustment burdens are being passed on to others by means
of the coordination. This applies not least to the one "big shot" in
the boat and its attitude with respect to all the other lesser lights.
Third, the joint economic policy objectives must actually be
attainable using the available economic policy instruments. Be-
sides the final targets (price stability and economic growth),
intermediate targets--such as the stabilization of (real) exchange
rates--may be helpful in the short run. But if the cooperative
approach is spelled out in overmuch detail, there is a danger that
attainability by means of economic policy measures might be
overrated.
In the light of such uncertainties regarding international cooper-
ation, it is not surprising that quite recently a number of skeptics have
been raising their voices more loudly and warning against illusions
about the possibilities inherent in cooperation. As you will know,
Martin Feldstein goes so far as to recommend the United States bid a
fond farewell to the strategy of international coordination of macroeco-
nomic policy. Without any doubt, coordination cannot be a substitute
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is no alternative to it, if a further disintegration of the world economy is
to be prevented. James Tobin expressed himself very clearly on this
point in a recent essay (1988, p. 77):
Coordination of macroeconomic policy is certainly not easy; maybe it is
impossible. But, in its absence, I suspect nationalistic solutions will be
sought: trade barriers, capital controls, and dual exchange rate systems. Wars
among nations with those weapons are likely to be mutually destructive.
Eventually, they too would evoke agitation for international coordination.
The most important thing seems to me to be that the concrete
blueprint of international cooperation not be overburdened with unre-
alistic expectations. A danger exists that responsible policymakers may
overestimate their own possibilities and underestimate or even disre-
gard obvious economic relationships. Let me enumerate a few basic
principles that appear to me to be essential in the cooperation process
(without wishing to make any claim to completeness):
® First, international cooperation should be confined to a broad
adjustment of economic policies, the detailed implementation of
which should remain the responsibility of the respective coun-
tries. Attempts at "fine-tuning" already founder frequently at the
national level; in an international context the problems would be
exacerbated. Correspondingly, historical experience of interna-
tional overall control of economic policy is not particularly en-
couraging. The economic summit meeting in Bonn in 1978 may
serve as one unfavourable example of this.
® Second, the international coordination of economic policies is
likely to promise particular success when unmistakable disequi-
libria are to be rectified. For one thing, a coincidence of national
interests and global economic requirements can no doubt be
achieved relatively easily in such circumstances. For another, the
necessary economic policy actions are easier to identify, despite
the above-mentioned uncertainties with respect to the model. We
may take as an example the Plaza Agreement of 1985, when all
those concerned agreed that the envisaged measures were in
everybody’s interest.
This should not be taken to imply that efforts at economic
policy coordination only make sense when "the cat is already
among the pigeons." However, permanent macroeconomic coor-
dination extending beyond special occasions would, in the long
run, impose too great a strain on the cooperation process. Signs of
"wear and tear" and a loss of credibility might be the conse-
quences. "In normal circumstances"--that is, given a reasonable
degree of economic convergence--mutual information and con-
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should suffice, without any formal coordination of concrete
economic policy measures being necessary. Under these condi-
tions, allegiance to a definite policy stance is not to be recom-
mended, if only because national interests not infrequently di-
verge. It is, however, an illusion to believe that, for the sake of
cooperation, a country would act for any length of time contrary
to its own best interests. In Europe, and more precisely within the
European Economic Community, we have had enough experi-
ence that goes to show that a determination to act in concert must
not be overstrained.
Third, an envisaged closer coordination of economic policy must
not be confined to monetary policy but must be extended to
include the other economic policy areas as well. it is true that
fiscal and structural policy are comparatively inflexible (not least
because they affect firmly entrenched interests and require pro-
tracted parliamentary deliberations), yet an unsatisfactory policy
mix and structural disiortions are often the cause of economic
disequilibria. As it is, monetary policy is often overburdened
when it is expected, on its own, to stabilize exchange rates, keep
inflation rates low, and maximize the rate of economic growth. It
may easily happen here that economically inconsistent objectives
are set, and their achievement perhaps even promised by politi-
cians, even though in this combination they are not attainable at
all.
Fourth, mechanistic rules and automatically operating economic
policy mechanisms should be avoided in the cooperation process.
So-called "objective indicators," which are the focus of so much
attention today, are no doubt a necessary instrument of analysis,
but no unambiguous instructions for action can be derived from
them. "Target zones" with their obligatory interventions may
considerable impede a stability-oriented monetary policy without
actually stabilizing exchange rate expectations in the final analy-
sis. In this context, I do not intend to be unfair to various authors
who understand "target zones" to mean wide margins of ffuct~-
ation for exchange rates and who envisage an adjustment of these
margins to inflation differentials, that is, in principle are thinking
of stable real exchange rates. Politically, such shifts in the ex-
change band, especially when the top or bottom end of the band
has already been reached, arouse strong resistance; this fact is
borne out by experience of the regionally limited exchange rate
system of the European Monetary System (EMS).
National economic policy must remain sufficiently flexible. It
is unrealistic to suggest that in democratically governed countries
economic policy decisions should be taken as soon as particular
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depend on a comprehensive general appraisal of the prevailing
economic conditions and an overall consensus on the necessary
measures, particularly in the field of fiscal policy.
Fifth, economic policy cooperation should be underpinned by
market mechanisms. Under a free market system, coordination is
effected primarily through market processes, that is, above all
through price adjustments. Thus, not only the prices of goods but
also those of capital (interest rates) or of currencies (exchange
rates) must be able to respond adequately to changed scarcity
conditions. Furthermore, in the event of adjustable exchange
rates, the problem of asymmetry in economic policy adjustment,
which is so often deplored today, would be largely defused.
While, under conditions of fixed exchange rates, most deficit
countries are induced to adopt unilateral economic policy mea-
sures relatively quickly, owing to their losses of reserves, under a
regime of floating exchange rates the surplus countries likewise
bear part of the real adjustment burden, owing to the deteriora-
tion of their international competitiveness caused by the appre-
ciation of their currencies.
Relative to the expectations, which are sometimes set fairly high,
the framework outlined here for the international coordination of
economic policy admittedly appears to be rather more modest. Even so,
cooperation among the major industrial countries remains very impor-
tant; it has now developed into an integral part of the world economic
system. The Deutsche Bundesbank, too, has always played its part in
international cooperation (and the experience gained in the process has
been incorporated into the five points raised above). The Bundesbank
has endorsed the various accords reached by the Group of Seven, from
the Plaza to Louvre II, and has participated time and again in the
concerted efforts to stabilize exchange rates, right up to the present.
Within Europe, cooperation among the central banks is particularly
close on account of the regulations governing the EMS. The Bundesbank
has belonged to this narrower margins arrangement from the very
beginning in 1973, doing so without any break at all, which can be said
of only three other central banks. Moreover, we, the Bundesbank, have
so far made the largest active financial contributions--ones resulting
from our commitments and ones going beyond that level. (I say this
because the impression has arisen among the public at large that we are
the chief brakemen on monetary policy developments in Europe.)
However, I do believe that national policy objectives are not in all
cases suitable as objects for exchanging in the international cooperation
process. Slightly less monetary stability, for example, would promote
neither economic growth nor exchange rate stability. The declarations of
the global economic summits therefore rightly state that the supreme250 Helmut Schlesinger
goal is "non-inflationary growth"--a form of words that is interesting,
because some participants nevertheless continue to speak of growth
with low inflation rates. International cooperation can do a great deal to
ensure that these "correct" words are followed by matching policy
actions, although the degree and depth of the coordination of the
individual national economic policies must be kept in line with the
prevailing circumstances. To sum up, I should like to associate myself
with the conclusions that Norman Fieleke recently reached in an article
on "Policy Coordination" (pp. 34-35):
Coordination is not an absolute good or bad or even a matter of principle;
it is a method to be chosen or rejected depending on the circumstances ....
The issue is not one of decentralized isolation versus full coordination at all
times, but of adaptation to the situation .... At a minimum, governments
should share current information on policy measures, and all may profit from
frequent discussion and debate in the various international forums.
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